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THE  FUTURE  OF  STATE  BLAINE  AMENDMENTS  IN
LIGHT  OF TRINITY  LUTHERAN :
STRENGTHENING  THE
NONDISCRIMINATION  ARGUMENT
Margo A. Borders*
INTRODUCTION
  The conversation surrounding religious freedom has reached a point of
particularly heightened tension in this country.  Issues of religious freedom
continue to surround controversies such as healthcare coverage, discrimina-
tion based on sexual identity, and general government involvement in relig-
ious affairs.  Of particular importance in the recent past has been the issue of
government funding for religious entities.  The Court has grappled with this
question in different contexts for decades, asking: In what cases might gov-
ernment funding come too close to impermissibly establishing religion, or in
what cases might the absence of the funding discriminate against religious
practice?
Some past conversation on the topic, particularly for school choice advo-
cates, has centered on the controversial state constitutional amendments that
often block all government funding for religious organizations.1  Referred to
as the “State Blaines,” or “Baby Blaines,” these amendments were inspired by
the federal Blaine Amendment, proposed and failed in 1875, that would have
restricted state governments from allocating any funding to religious enti-
ties.2  Opponents of the State Blaine Amendments (“State Blaines”) have
questioned the constitutionality of applying the no-funding provisions in
ways that are discriminatory to religious organizations.  The Court’s recent
holding in Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer3 presents an
example of a challenged state policy based on a strict state no-funding provi-
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2019; Bachelor of Arts,
Theology, Boston College, 2016.  I would like to thank Professor Rick Garnett for his
guidance and helpful comments in the drafting of this Note, my family and friends for
their support, and the staff of the Notre Dame Law Review for their revisions.  I am especially
thankful to my grandfather, whose devotion to the Constitution inspires me every day.  All
errors are my own.
1 See infra Part I.
2 Id.
3 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017).
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sion, and the Court’s upholding of a church’s right to participate in a neutral
government funding program while continuing to freely practice its
religion.4
In particular, the Court’s strong affirmation of nondiscrimination princi-
ples of the First Amendment in Trinity Lutheran could signal the Court’s will-
ingness to hear more challenges to State Blaines and to be receptive to the
idea that these strict no-funding provisions could facially contradict the First
Amendment’s mandate to protect religious practice.5  Therefore, this Note
will examine the interaction between, and possible consequences stemming
from, the Trinity Lutheran opinion and the State Blaines.  In particular, this
Note will examine whether this new jurisprudence regarding the constitu-
tionality of allowing or prohibiting public state funding for religious organi-
zations could provide new grounds for school choice advocates to attack the
constitutionality of State Blaines.
In Part I, this Note will examine a brief history of the proposed federal
Blaine Amendment, and the subsequent adoption of many State Blaines
across the nation.  Next, in Part II, the Note will discuss why the State Blaines
are frequently debated, specifically in the context of the issue of school
choice.  The Note will then examine two of the main arguments against the
constitutionality of State Blaines—the animus arguments and the First
Amendment arguments—and will examine the strengths and weaknesses of
each argument.  In Part III, the Note will discuss the culmination of recent
caselaw in the Trinity Lutheran opinion.  Finally, in Part IV, this Note will
contemplate the effect that this recent court opinion could have on attacking
the constitutionality of State Blaines, particularly for advocates of school
choice.  This Note will ultimately argue that while the majority opinion in
Trinity Lutheran does not explicitly mention State Blaines, the Free Exercise
Clause jurisprudence affirmed by the opinion could strengthen the likeli-
hood of future successful challenges to the State Blaines on constitutional
grounds using a nondiscrimination argument, and will make success more
likely with this argument than with an animus argument.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF “BLAINES”
In the mid to late nineteenth century, during the rise of the so-called
“common schools,”6 the issue of religion in schools came to the forefront of
American politics.  In Massachusetts, Horace Mann, the nation’s first State
Secretary of Education and the “father of American public education,”7 advo-
cated for a public education system that was unaffiliated with any particular
4 See infra Part III.
5 See infra Part IV.
6 For a general overview of the development of public education in America, see
Peter H. Hanna, Note, School Vouchers, State Constitutions, and Free Speech, 25 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2371, 2382–84 (2004).
7 JOSEPH E. BRYSON & SAMUEL H. HOUSTON, JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND PUBLIC
FUNDS FOR RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS, THE BURGER YEARS, 1969–1986, at 16 (1990).
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religion.8  However, this does not mean that religion was absent from Ameri-
can daily life or education.9  Indeed, after the creation of American public
schools, teachings of Protestantism were prevalent in the education system,10
as were fears about the rise of Catholic influence.  As the Catholic population
was growing,11 particularly in cities like New York, Chicago, Philadelphia,
Boston, Cincinnati, Baltimore, San Francisco, and St. Paul,12 Protestants
began to resist the “Catholic menace,”13 specifically through campaigns to
deny public funding for Catholic or any “sectarian” institutions.14  Political
tensions between Protestants and Catholics gave rise to the proposal of a con-
stitutional amendment in 1875 that has since had lasting impacts on the
modern discussion of school funding and religious freedom in the United
States.
A. The Federal Blaine Amendment
The proposed amendment to the Constitution was a response to the
school funding controversy between Protestants and Catholics.15  In Septem-
ber of 1875, President Ulysses S. Grant advocated a constitutional amend-
8 Hanna, supra note 6, at 2383.
9 See Joseph P. Viteritti, Blaine’s Wake: School Choice, the First Amendment, and State Con-
stitutional Law, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 657, 662 (1998) (noting that “[t]he religious
congregation was at the heart of the American notion of community”).
10 See id. at 666 (“The common-school curriculum promoted a religious orthodoxy of
its own that was centered on the teachings of mainstream Protestantism . . . .”).  For exam-
ple, under Horace Mann’s leadership, Massachusetts public schools mandated daily read-
ings from the Bible. Id. at 666–67; see also Steven K. Green, The Blaine Amendment
Reconsidered, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 38, 45 (1992) (“Schools were the primary promulgators
of [the] Protestant way of life.”); Ward M. McAfee, The Historical Context of the Failed Federal
Blaine Amendment of 1876, 2 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 1, 3 (2004) (“Most Protestant Americans
in the 1870s firmly believed in religious instruction in public education.”).  In fact, the New
York Public School Society proclaimed that forced reading of the King James Bible in
public schools did not constitute a “sectarian education.”  Hanna, supra note 6, at 2386.
11 See Kyle Duncan, Secularism’s Laws: State Blaine Amendments and Religious Persecution,
72 FORDHAM L. REV. 493, 504 (2003) (noting that the Catholic population in America had
grown from 10% in 1866 to 12.9% by 1891); see also Jay S. Bybee & David W. Newton, Of
Orphans and Vouchers: Nevada’s “Little Blaine Amendment” and the Future of Religious Participa-
tion in Public Programs, 2 NEV. L.J. 551, 555 (2002) (noting that fewer than 1% of Americans
were Catholics at the time of the founding, but that figure grew to more than 10% by the
end of the Civil War).
12 Viteritti, supra note 9, at 669.
13 The tension between the Protestants and Catholics has been explained to be rooted
in “the Americans’ inability to reconcile the newly established concepts of liberty and inde-
pendence with the ‘authoritarian organization of the Catholic Church.’”  Brandi Richard-
son, Comment, Eradicating Blaine’s Legacy of Hate: Removing the Barrier to State Funding of
Religious Education, 52 CATH. U. L. REV. 1041, 1049, 1051 (2003) (quoting LLOYD P. JORGEN-
SON, THE STATE AND THE NON-PUBLIC SCHOOL: 1825–1925, at 29 (1987)).
14 Viteritti, supra note 9, at 670; see also Green, supra note 10, at 43.  These legislative
actions were provoked by Catholic requests for public funds for their own schools.
Duncan, supra note 11, at 505–07.
15 See Green, supra note 10, at 47–57.
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ment to keep public funding from private schools in order to gain support
from the Protestants and to definitively end the debate about religion in
schools.16  The speech garnered wide support across the Republican Party,17
prompting Representative James Blaine of Maine, who was seeking the
Republican presidential nomination in the next election, to sponsor Grant’s
amendment in the House of Representatives.18  On December 14, 1875,19
Blaine submitted a proposal that read:
No State shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; and no money raised by taxation in
any State for the support of public schools, or derived from any public fund
therefore, nor any public lands devoted thereto, shall ever be under the con-
trol of any religious sect, nor shall any money so raised or lands so devoted
be divided between religious sects or denominations.20
The amendment, which would have been the Sixteenth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution, would have applied the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment21 to the states, and more importantly, would have prohib-
ited state governments from allocating public funding to religious organiza-
tions.22  Many scholars have written about the motivations behind the
proposal of the federal Blaine Amendment, and have concluded that,
although Blaine was motivated by his own political ambitions in proposing
the amendment, its near success in Congress can be attributed to longstand-
ing anti-Catholic bias.23  The anti-Catholic animus that guided the amend-
16 Id. at 47–49 (noting that President Grant’s speech “clearly aligned the Republican
Party with the Protestant cause,” and that in making the speech, he “sought to realign the
party in favor of [free] education”).
17 See id. at 48 (“The Protestant Christian Advocate wrote that the speech was ‘full of
wisdom’ and called for a constitutional amendment to put the suggestions into practice.”
(quoting Something Significant, 50 CHRISTIAN ADVOC., 313, 316 (1875))).  Green also notes
that the only protests to Grant’s speech were from Catholics. See id.
18 Id. at 49–50; see also Mark Edward DeForrest, An Overview and Evaluation of State
Blaine Amendments: Origins, Scope, and First Amendment Concerns, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
551, 557 (2003); Viteritti, supra note 9, at 670.
19 Duncan, supra note 11, at 509.
20 DeForrest, supra note 18, at 556 (quoting H.R.J. Res. 1, 44th Cong. (1875)).
21 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
22 See DeForrest, supra note 18, at 557.  Viteritti notes that a prohibition on use of
federal funds for religious education was unsupported by any legal precedent at the time,
so Blaine’s constitutional argument for his amendment was weak. See Viteritti, supra note
9, at 671 (explaining that Blaine claimed to be correcting a “constitutional defect” (quot-
ing F. William O’Brien, The States and “No Establishment”: Proposed Amendments to the Constitu-
tion Since 1798, 4 WASHBURN L.J. 183, 188 (1965))).
23 See Richard W. Garnett, The Theology of the Blaine Amendments, 2 FIRST AMEND. L. REV.
45, 62 (2004) (“[The State Blaine Amendments] cannot be fully understood without refer-
ence to the irreducibly anti-Catholic ideology that inspired and sustained them.”); McAfee,
supra note 10, at 4 (noting that most supporters of the Blaine Amendment saw the propo-
sal as “aimed solely at thwarting the threat of the Roman Catholic ‘sect’ to the American
public school”); Viteritti, supra note 9, at 659 (“[T]he Blaine Amendment is a remnant of
nineteenth-century religious bigotry promulgated by nativist political leaders who were
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ment will further the discussion about potential challenges to the State
Blaine Amendments in Part II.
Although the amendment gained much support in Congress and passed
the House, it ultimately failed in the Senate by only four votes.24  The life of
the proposed amendment was not finished, however, as its effects are still
being felt on the state level today.25
B. State Constitutions and “Baby Blaines”
The Blaine Amendment failed to pass at the federal level, but it created
a strong movement within the Republican Party26 that would greatly affect
the conversation about church and state separation, specifically the “national
debate over aid to religious schools.”27  The momentum of the separationist
movement was felt in the states, where state constitutional amendments
restricting religious school funding were being passed rapidly.28  While
twelve states adopted similar provisions in the 1870s,29 Congress also began
requiring territories seeking admission to the Union to adopt these separa-
tionist provisions in their original constitutions.30  By the 1890s, around
thirty states would incorporate these types of constitutional amendments,31
alarmed by the growth of immigrant populations and who had a particular disdain for
Catholics.”); Richardson, supra note 13, at 1053 (“Many sources, including proponents of
the legislation, recognized the legislative efforts of the time as waging ‘a general war
against the Catholic Church.’” (quoting Viteritti, supra note 9, at 672)).
24 Duncan, supra note 11, at 510.  For a comprehensive look at the life of the proposed
Blaine Amendment in both houses of Congress, see Green, supra note 10, at 57–68.  The
arguments in Congress supported the specifically anti-Catholic ideas behind the amend-
ment, as senators made statements directly referencing and attacking the Church. See
DeForrest, supra note 18, at 570.
25 Viteritti, supra note 9, at 674 (“Today, the legal restrictions imposed by States to
curtail aid to religious schools and their students remain quite powerful.”).
26 Id. at 672 (explaining that the separationist principles of the Blaine Amendment
were “incorporated into the Republican national party platform”); see also Duncan, supra
note 11, at 512.
27 Viteritti, supra note 9, at 672.
28 Duncan, supra note 11, at 513 (describing the “proliferation” of these state amend-
ments in the late nineteenth century).
29 Id. (reporting these twelve states as Illinois, Pennsylvania, Missouri, Alabama,
Nebraska, Colorado, Texas, Georgia, New Hampshire, Minnesota, California, and Louisi-
ana).  Although most states adopting Blaine Amendments did so after the funding issue
was presented in Congress, there are a few exceptions.  For example, New York adopted a
restrictive funding law in the 1840s, well before funding became a federal issue. Id.
30 See Viteritti, supra note 9, at 673.  An example of congressional legislation that man-
dated this process is the Enabling Act of 1889, ch. 180, 25 Stat. 676, which forced new states
like Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Washington to adopt this provision in
order to be admitted into the Union.  Viteritti, supra note 9, at 673.  The wording of the
Enabling Act is almost identical to the proposed federal Blaine Amendment, and it has
been argued that the words were “intended to reinforce the generic Protestantism of the
common schools.”  DeForrest, supra note 18, at 574.
31 See DeForrest, supra note 18, at 573.
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and today, thirty-seven states have adopted some version of the Blaine
Amendment into their constitutions,32 which are also referred to as “Baby
Blaines.”33
State Blaines are quite diverse and vary widely by state,34 so it is difficult
to generalize about their substance.35  Many of the amendments prohibit
state funding of religious schools altogether, some only prohibit nondiscrimi-
natory funding of religious schools, and some have not been interpreted at
all.36  Frank Kemerer has categorized states into restrictive, permissive, and
uncertain in terms of restricting aid to sectarian schools.37  Within the restric-
tive category, several states prohibit both direct and indirect aid to sectarian
schools, while some have more general restrictions on aid.38  Mark DeForrest
categorizes states with Blaine provisions in a different way—he puts the states
on a continuum, on which one side are State Blaines that narrowly restrict
state funding to private education,39 and on the other side are states with
broadly interpreted provisions that more widely allow funding to private, or
sectarian education.40  In the middle are states with some moderate provi-
sions that “permit some form of government aid to religious schools but pro-
hibit overt funding.”41
Some State Blaines target just education, while other, more extensive
State Blaines prohibit any governmental aid that would support any sectarian
institution.42  For example, the Missouri Constitution has both a specific pro-
32 See Blaine Amendments, INST. FOR JUSTICE, http://ij.org/issues/school-choice/blaine-
amendments/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2018).
33 David Wilhelmsen, Note, Orphans, Baby Blaines, and the Brave New World of State
Funded Education: Why Nevada’s New Voucher Program Should Be Upheld Under Both State and
Federal Law, 42 J. LEGIS. 257, 258 (2016).
34 DeForrest, supra note 18, at 576.
35 Because the amendments vary greatly, this Note will not examine the substance of
each state constitutional provision in depth.  Instead, this Note will speak about State
Blaine Amendments as generally prohibiting state funding from religious schools in some
way and will examine the potential challenges to this type of state amendment.
36 See Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, the Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty:
Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L. REV. 155, 188 (2004).
37 Viteritti, supra note 9, at 674–75 (citing Frank R. Kemerer, State Constitutions and
School Vouchers, 120 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 37 (1997)).
38 Id. at 675 (citing Kemerer, supra note 37, at 5–7).  On the other hand, some states
do proscribe the use of “vouchers or tax benefits” for students attending private schools,
once again highlighting the wide variety in the constitutional provisions among the states.
Id.
39 While some provisions, like Michigan’s, prohibit state funding for all private
schools, most prohibit state funding specifically to sectarian, or religious, schools.  DeFor-
rest, supra note 18, at 588–89.
40 Id. at 577.  States with less restrictive Blaine provisions include New Jersey and Mas-
sachusetts, while states with the most broad and restrictive Blaine provisions include Flor-
ida and Missouri. Id. at 577, 587.
41 Id. at 577.
42 Id. at 587–88 (identifying examples of states with extremely broad funding provi-
sions, such as Missouri, Oklahoma, Indiana, Georgia, Colorado, and others); see also Bybee
& Newton, supra note 11, at 559 (giving examples of California’s constitution, which pro-
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-5\NDL512.txt unknown Seq: 7 18-JUL-18 7:21
2018] the  future  of  state  blaine  amendments 2147
vision prohibiting government funding to “help to support or sustain any
private or public school, academy, seminary, college, university, or other
institution of learning controlled by any religious creed, church or sectarian
denomination,”43 and a more general prohibition on government funding
for any religious institution.44  While the differences between the State
Blaines are vast, they all share a common feature—“[t]he plain object of disa-
bling religion . . . .”45  Most importantly, the ways in which the State Blaines
have been interpreted and applied by their respective state courts determines
whether they arguably violate the U.S. Constitution.46  In Part II, this Note
will examine the different approaches both state and federal courts have
taken in response to challenges to State Blaines, and will further argue that
the First Amendment challenges will be strengthened with the modern
Court’s developing jurisprudence, evidenced by Trinity Lutheran.
II. CHALLENGING THE BLAINES
A. Public Funding for Religious Education and the
Argument for School Choice
After examining the origin of the Blaine Amendment and its long-last-
ing effect on states today, the questions remain: Why are the Blaine Amend-
ments of such concern?  Why have so many scholars evaluated challenges to
the amendments, and why is the future of the Blaine Amendments of any
import?  The answers lie at the intersection of religious freedom and educa-
tion in the country today—school choice.
The term “school choice” generally refers to any policy that gives parents
the choice of different educational options, such as “public school transfer
vides a funding restriction specifically aimed at education, and the Illinois Constitution,
which prohibits funding for any organization with a sectarian purpose).  For another look
at specific states’ provisions, such as Vermont, Wisconsin, Arizona, and Missouri, see Aaron
E. Schwartz, Comment, Dusting off the Blaine Amendment: Two Challenges to Missouri’s Anti-
Establishment Tradition, 73 MO. L. REV. 129, 149–55 (2008).
43 DeForrest, supra note 18, at 587 (quoting MO. CONST. art. IX, § 8).
44
That no money shall ever be taken from the public treasury, directly or indirectly,
in aid of any church, sect or denomination of religion, or in aid of any priest,
preacher, minister or teacher thereof, as such; and that no preference shall be
given to nor any discrimination made against any church, sect or creed of relig-
ion, or any form of religious faith or worship.
MO. CONST. art. I, § 7.  This provision was at issue in Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia,
Inc. v. Comer, and will be discussed in Part III infra.  137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017).
45 Duncan, supra note 11, at 516.
46 See id. at 524 (arguing that many state courts have interpreted the State Blaines as
going “beyond the federal Establishment Clause,” and thus are unconstitutional interpreta-
tions); see also Viteritti, supra note 9, at 680–81 (explaining that state courts, through their
own constitutions, have defined rights more broadly than the Supreme Court has with the
Federal Constitution, but the problem arises when the state courts’ interpretations
“abridge federally defined rights”).
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options, charter and magnet schools, home schooling, scholarships, vouch-
ers, and tax credits or deductions.”47  School choice programs give funds,
often called “vouchers,” that would have been spent by the state on a student
in a public school to students, often low-income students,48 for use at a pri-
vate school.49  Alternatively, the programs could give tax credits, which come
either as tax-credit-funded scholarship programs, personal tax credits and
deductions, or refundable tax credit programs.50  School choice opponents
argue that when states give money to religious schools directly or indirectly
through school choice programs, the government effectively funds religious
education, which is prohibited by most State Blaines.51  Therefore, if school
choice proponents could successfully challenge State Blaines, they could
eliminate a huge roadblock on the path to school choice programs.52  State
Blaines have therefore often been challenged in the context of school choice
issues.
On the federal level, school choice was deemed constitutional in 2002 by
the Supreme Court in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, where the Court examined a
federal constitutional challenge by state taxpayers to the Ohio Pilot Scholar-
47 RICHARD D. KOMER & OLIVIA GRADY, INST. FOR JUSTICE & AM. LEGISLATIVE EXCH.
COUNCIL, SCHOOL CHOICE AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS: A GUIDE TO DESIGNING SCHOOL
CHOICE PROGRAMS 9 (2d ed. 2016).
48 See, e.g., Joseph P. Viteritti, School Choice: The Threshold Question, 75 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
251, 253 (2001) (describing some of the first voucher plans in the country in Milwaukee
and Cleveland as being need-based voucher programs).
49 Cf. KOMER & GRADY, supra note 47, at 9.
50 Id. Refundable tax credit programs give eligible parents “tax credits for educational
expenses up to the limit of tax they owe and then a ‘refund’ from the government for any
remaining educational expenses that are below a set ceiling on such expenses.” Id. at
9–10.  In general, tax credit programs, which involve privately funded scholarships, have
not been challenged as often or successfully as the voucher programs because the funding
is private. Id. at 7–8; see also Hanna, supra note 6, at 2395 (describing tax credits as more
like “income tax breaks granted by the government” rather than “government-endorsed
checks”).
51 The question of school choice is often intertwined with issues of religious freedom
because the majority of private schools in America are religious. Statistics About Nonpublic
Education in the United States, OFFICE OF NON-PUB. EDUC. (Dec. 2, 2016), https://www2.ed
.gov/about/offices/list/oii/nonpublic/statistics.html (noting that as of 2013–2014, almost
seventy percent of private schools were religious).
52 This Note will not argue for or against school choice.  Instead, it will examine differ-
ent arguments for and against State Blaine Amendments, which could have important
effects for school choice programs.  For more extensive analyses of school choice, see gen-
erally Nicole Stelle Garnett & Richard W. Garnett, School Choice, the First Amendment, and
Social Justice, 4 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 301 (2000).  For a discussion about the “legality and
morality of educational choice,” see id. at 309. See also JOSEPH P. VITERITTI, CHOOSING
EQUALITY: SCHOOL CHOICE, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CIVIL SOCIETY (1999) (arguing how
and why school choice can advance equality through charter schools and vouchers for the
poor); Viteritti, supra note 48, at 259 (arguing for the implementation of school choice
and describing it as a “moral question”). But see Steven K. Green, The Legal Argument
Against Private School Choice, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 37, 39 (1993) (discussing the policy argu-
ments and legal theories that go against school choice).
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ship Program.53  The taxpayers argued that the program violated the Estab-
lishment Clause because, by funding students who went to religious schools,
the program had the effect of “advancing or inhibiting religion.”54  The
Court found that school choice programs are constitutional as long as they
are made available “without regard to the sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-
nonpublic nature of the institution benefited,” as well as that “[a]ny aid . . .
that ultimately flows to religious institutions does so only as a result of the
genuinely independent and private choices of aid recipients.”55  In sum, the
Court found that school choice programs, if neutral and focused on the free-
dom of the parent to choose the school of their choice, do not violate the
Establishment Clause.56  While the Establishment Clause invalidates govern-
ment action that directly funds religion, like directly paying the religious
organization, school choice programs give a family the choice to use the
money at whatever type of educational institution they desire.57
After the Supreme Court ruled that school choice programs do not vio-
late the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution, eliminating the argu-
ment against school choice on the federal level,58 opponents have
challenged school choice programs that include religious schools on the
state level by relying on State Blaines,59 which are more specific on their face
about restricting funding for religious organizations.60
Several years after Zelman, the Supreme Court in Locke v. Davey consid-
ered the constitutionality of disallowing a student pursuing a degree in devo-
tional theology from using a state scholarship.61  The student was excluded
53 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
54 Id. at 648–49 (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 222–23 (1997)).
55 Id. at 650–51 (quoting Witters v. Wash. Dep’t of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481,
487 (1986)); see also KOMER & GRADY, supra note 47, at 10 (describing the essential charac-
teristics of a school voucher program as “religious neutrality” and “true private choice”);
Robert A. Dietzel, Comment, The Future of School Vouchers: A Reflection on Zelman v. Sim-
mons-Harris and an Examination of the Blaine Amendments as a Viable Challenge to Sectarian
School Aid Programs, 2003 MICH. ST. DCL L. REV. 791, 793–94 (describing these require-
ments as “very general and easily met”).
56 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 652–53; see Dietzel, supra note 55, at 794 (explaining that the
Establishment Clause is not violated by these aid plans because they “are not designed or
administered with the intent of aiding or endorsing religion,” but instead provide the
opportunity “to choose an alternative to the traditional public school”).  However, the
Court did rule decades earlier that direct aid to parochial schools in the form of salary
supplements to teachers constituted excessive entanglement of church and state, and thus
violated the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.  Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602
(1971).
57 Steven G. Calabresi & Abe Salander, Religion and the Equal Protection Clause: Why the
Constitution Requires School Vouchers, 65 FLA. L. REV. 909, 1032 (2013).
58 See, e.g., Richardson, supra note 13, at 1063–64.
59 See KOMER & GRADY, supra note 47, at 10 (“[O]pponents were left with state constitu-
tions as their only avenue for attacking school choice programs.”).
60 See Dietzel, supra note 55, at 794 (“[P]rovisions of most state constitutions are more
specific in their proscription of state supported religious schools.”).
61 Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
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from doing this under a Washington constitutional provision that prohibited
the state scholarship money from supporting a religious education.62  How-
ever, the student would have been able to attend the religious school and
keep the scholarship if he studied religion from a secular perspective.63  The
Court ruled that because “[t]he State has merely chosen not to fund a dis-
tinct category of instruction” instead of making students “choose between
their religious beliefs and receiving a government benefit,” the state’s action
did not violate the First Amendment.64  The Court effectively established that
while school choice programs themselves do not violate the U.S. Constitu-
tion, states could rely on their own constitutional provisions to limit the
options in a school choice program.65  The holding in Davey affords some
latitude to opponents of school choice to rely on State Blaines to potentially
take away religious options from school choice programs.66
The states’ potential ability to use State Blaines in this way makes it criti-
cal to examine the ways in which state courts have interpreted State Blaines,
and ultimately, to examine if federal courts have found or could potentially
interpret these state provisions to be more constricting on religious freedom
than the Constitution allows.
B. The Animus Argument
Before examining other possible First Amendment arguments against
Blaine Amendments, this Note will examine a common argument made
using the background and motives of the State Blaines.67  Those who oppose
State Blaine Amendments often cite the Amendments’ basis in religious ani-
mosity towards Catholicism, starting with the proposal of the federal Blaine
Amendment.68  This argument is grounded in the idea that the otherwise
facially neutral amendments were motivated solely by a hatred of Catholi-
cism,69 and so are constitutionally invalid under either the Equal Protection
62 Id. at 717–18.
63 Id. at 716–17.
64 Id. at 720–21.
65 See KOMER & GRADY, supra note 47, at 7.
66 Id. Some have argued that the holding in Davey is narrow, applying only to the
training of clergy, and because Blaine Amendments are broader restrictions on govern-
ment funding for any religious organization, the possibility of holding the Blaine Amend-
ments unconstitutional is still open.  Calabresi & Salander, supra note 57, at 1041.  The
Court in Trinity Lutheran advances this opinion by arguably narrowing Davey’s holding. See
infra Section III.B.
67 See Marc D. Stern, Blaine Amendments, Anti-Catholicism, and Catholic Dogma, 2 FIRST
AMEND. L. REV 153, 158 (2004) (claiming that in the debate over State Blaines, most of the
attention has been on animus arguments).
68 For a discussion of the anti-Catholic motives for the Blaine Amendment, see sources
cited supra note 23.
69 This is a frequently debated assertion, and it is often difficult to articulate a legisla-
tor’s exact motivation in passing a specific law.  However, at least some anti-Catholic motiva-
tion is clear from the history of the proposal for the federal Blaine Amendment. See Stern,
supra note 67, at 166–67 (“It would be fruitless to deny that the Blaine Amendments taken
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,70 or the Establishment and Free Exer-
cise Clauses of the First Amendment.71
The argument for unconstitutional animus under the Equal Protection
Clause is based on the general agreement that federal caselaw presumptively
makes unconstitutional any laws that are motivated by a prejudice against a
certain class.72 Romer v. Evans illustrates this general principle, as the Court
held, in an opinion authored by Justice Kennedy, that a provision of the Col-
orado Constitution prohibiting state legislation protecting discrimination on
the basis of sexuality violated the Equal Protection Clause.73  The Court in
Romer put special emphasis on the rationale of legislators in passing the legis-
lation, and so an Equal Protection analysis would focus on the intent behind
the law.74  In addition to proving impermissible motive, the plaintiff must
prove the absence of any legitimate governmental interest served by the law
in order to succeed on the claim.75
Scholars also argue that government action based on specifically relig-
ious animus could be challenged under the Establishment and Free Exercise
Clauses.  Challenges to State Blaines using the First Amendment will be
examined further in Section II.C, but here, an argument based solely on
religious animus using the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment is
examined. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah illustrates
the idea that laws “that are designed to exclude disfavored faiths” are uncon-
stitutional under the Religion Clauses.76  The Court in Lukumi struck down a
law based on animosity toward a certain religion.77  The Court expressed that
“a law targeting religious beliefs . . . is never permissible,” and that “if the
object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their relig-
as group were aimed at rebuffing Catholic efforts to obtain funding for their schools.”);
Richardson, supra note 13, at 1075 (“It would be impossible to argue that the intent of the
Blaine amendments was not to ‘harm a politically unpopular group.’” (quoting Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996)). But see Steven K. Green, The Insignificance of the Blaine
Amendment, 2008 BYU L. REV. 295 (arguing that the possible motivations of the federal
Blaine Amendment cannot clearly be tied to the passing of similar state provisions).
70 See Richardson, supra note 13, at 1075–76 (citing Romer, 517 U.S. at 635).
71 See Richard W. Garnett & Jackson C. Blais, Religious Freedom and Recycled Tires: The
Meaning and Implications of Trinity Lutheran, 2016–2017 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 105, 109 (first
citing United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013); then citing Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)).
72 See Stern, supra note 67, at 166–67 (first citing Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228
(1982); and then citing Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985)); see also Romer, 517
U.S. at 635 (holding that the purpose of a law cannot be to make a class of people unequal
to everyone else).
73 Romer, 517 U.S. at 623–24.
74 Richardson, supra note 13, at 1072, 1075.
75 See Susannah W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 887, 896
(2012) (citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993)).
76 Brief of Constitutional Law Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Plain-
tiffs–Appellees and Affirmance at 12, Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 876 F.3d
116 (4th Cir. 2017) (No. 17-1351).
77 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 542 (1993).
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ious motivation, the law is not neutral . . . and it is invalid unless it is justified
by a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to advance that interest.”78
The Court establishes that in the Free Exercise context, “[f]acial neutrality is
not determinative,” and therefore overt or covert targeting of “religious con-
duct for distinctive treatment” violates the Free Exercise Clause.79  Scholars
argue that the State Blaines could be attacked in federal court on the same
constitutional basis, using either the Equal Protection Clause or the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment, because of the animosity towards Catholics
that motivated their creation.80
Several state courts have upheld challenges to school choice provisions
against State Blaines,81 and Arizona in particular mentioned this animus
argument in interpreting its State Blaine and ruling against a challenge to
state funding for religious schools.82  While Arizona’s Supreme Court based
its holding on the idea that the tax credit did not advance religion, and thus
did not violate the Establishment Clause, the court notably wrote about the
Blaine Amendment as “a clear manifestation of religious bigotry,” and that it
would be difficult to “divorce the amendment’s language from the insidious
discriminatory intent that prompted it.”83  The state courts are not the only
courts that have written about this aspect of the Blaine Amendment.  In fact,
the Supreme Court itself has recognized the discriminatory motives behind
the original Blaine Amendment, and generally any “hostility to aid to perva-
sively sectarian schools,”84 signaling a recognition that animus is a part of the
conversation about the constitutionality of State Blaines.
78 Id. at 533 (citation omitted).
79 Id. at 534.
80 See Richard W. Garnett, Brown’s Promise, Blaine’s Legacy, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 651,
673 (2000). See generally Richardson, supra note 13.
81 Michael J. Dailey, Comment, Blaine’s Bigotry: Preventing School Vouchers in
Oklahoma . . . Temporarily, 39 TULSA L. REV. 207, 226, 226 n.219 (2003) (noting specifically
that Wisconsin, Ohio, Arizona, and Illinois have upheld school choice programs).
82 See Richardson, supra note 13, at 1060–62 (citing Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606
(Ariz. 1999) (en banc)); see also Dailey, supra note 81, at 226–27.
83 Richardson, supra note 13, at 1062 (quoting Kotterman, 972 P.2d at 624).
84 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828 (2000) (holding in a plurality opinion that a
program that allowed federal funds to be given by the state to any school, including relig-
iously affiliated private schools, did not violate the Establishment Clause).
Opposition to aid to “sectarian” schools acquired prominence in the 1870’s with
Congress’ consideration . . . of the Blaine Amendment . . . .  Consideration of the
amendment arose at a time of pervasive hostility to the Catholic Church and to
Catholics in general, and it was an open secret that “sectarian” was code for
“Catholic.”
Id. Furthermore, the plurality of the Court proclaimed that the exclusion of “pervasively
sectarian schools from otherwise permissible aid programs” is a doctrine “born of bigotry,”
and “should be buried now.”  Id. at 829; see also Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639,
719–21 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (recognizing the specific anti-Catholic environment
that gave rise to “a movement that sought to amend several state constitutions . . . to make
certain that government would not help pay for ‘sectarian’ . . . schooling for children”).
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While recognizing the strength of this argument,85 as well as the anti-
Catholic bias that motivated the federal Blaine Amendment,86 this Note rec-
ognizes several difficulties of relying solely on an animus argument to consti-
tutionally challenge State Blaines.  First, the animus argument is problematic
because of a lack of a clear legal framework on which to base these chal-
lenges.87  In explaining its analysis of unconstitutional animus, the Court has
laid out different factors to consider.  For example, in equal protection cases,
the Court has focused on “the text of an act; the full context leading up to
and following enactment; the act’s real-world effects; and the degree of fit
between an act’s stated purpose and its actual structure.”88  The Court in
Lukumi similarly provided factors relevant to determining “improper pur-
pose” under the Religion Clauses, such as the text and structure of the law,
the “effect of a law in its real operation,” the events surrounding the enact-
ment of the law, and the legislative history of the law.89  The Court’s flexible
factor tests make them difficult to apply, and it is still unclear exactly what
evidence can be used in proving the motive behind a government act.90
Finally, in regard to equal protection challenges, there are few relevant cases
to examine in forming a coherent framework for the animus doctrine.91
Another major obstacle is the large number and variety of the Blaines
across the United States.92  While it does seem that the proposed federal
Blaine Amendment was motivated by anti-Catholic animus, it becomes
harder to specifically connect that bias to the passage of each State Blaine.93
85 See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Zelman ’s Future: Vouchers, Sectarian Providers, and
the Next Round of Constitutional Battles, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 917, 967 (2003) (“The anti-
Catholic origins of at least some of the Blaine Amendments may be a powerful source of
constitutional condemnation.”).
86 See generally McAfee, supra note 10 (describing the anti-Catholic forces at work
behind the originally proposed federal Blaine Amendment in 1875).
87 See generally Pollvogt, supra note 75.
88 Brief of Constitutional Law Scholars, supra note 76, at 16 (citation omitted).
89 Id. at 13 (quoting Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520, 535 (1993)).
90 For example, in reference to the litigation surrounding the executive orders ban-
ning travel for certain populations, President Trump’s administration argued that courts
should not consider unofficial statements, like campaign statements, when deciding if a
government policy has a discriminatory purpose.  Jim Oleske, Animus Revisited: DOJ Fails to
Explain Change in Position on Relevance of Campaign Statements, TAKE CARE BLOG (June 6,
2017), https://takecareblog.com/blog/animus-revisited-doj-fails-to-explain-change-in-posi-
tion-on-relevance-of-campaign-statements.
91 Pollvogt, supra note 75, at 900, 901 n.64 (listing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620
(1996); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); Palmore v. Sidoti,
466 U.S. 429 (1984); and U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973)).  Pollvogt
examines the prevailing jurisprudence and argues for an animus framework that finds ani-
mus in two different ways—finding evidence of animus in the legislative record, or by find-
ing it in the structure of the law itself. Id. at 926.
92 See DeForrest, supra note 18, at 576.
93 See Green, supra note 69, at 327–28 (arguing not only that a connection between
the motivations behind the federal Blaine Amendment and State Blaines is tenuous, but
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-5\NDL512.txt unknown Seq: 14 18-JUL-18 7:21
2154 notre dame law review [vol. 93:5
If it can be demonstrated that the particular state was motivated by anti-Cath-
olic sentiment in passing its State Blaine, it would not necessarily be difficult
to invalidate the amendment based on an animus argument,94 but the diffi-
culty comes in proving the subjective motivation of legislators,95 which often
is not completely clear from documentation of state constitutional conven-
tions.96  Susannah Pollvogt argues that animus could be proven by “pointing
to direct evidence of private bias in the legislative record,”97 but as Steven
Green points out, this can be a difficult and complicated endeavor.98
The difficulty of carrying out constitutional challenges to the State
Blaines based solely on an animus argument leads scholars to look at other
potential First Amendment challenges, which this Note argues could stand
alone in sustaining successful challenges to State Blaines.99
C. First Amendment Challenges
The conversation about the constitutionality of State Blaines under the
U.S. Constitution revolves around components of the First Amendment: the
Free Speech Clause and the Religion Clauses, which include the Free Exer-
cise and Establishment Clauses.100  The crux of the argument follows that
because State Blaines are more restrictive than the U.S. Constitution in
regards to restrictions on public funding of religious entities,101 they violate
the Constitution.  This Note will argue that the combination of the three
clauses of the First Amendment create an “overarching” principle of nondis-
also noting that many of the state no-funding provisions were drafted before the federal
Blaine Amendment debates).
94 Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 85, at 967 (arguing that in such a case, “federal constitu-
tional law would likely support the invalidation of such an amendment”). But see id. at 969
(recognizing that if anti-Catholic motivation was the “most persuasive constitutional argu-
ment” against the State Blaines, the fight against the Blaines would be “twisted and
uphill”).
95 See Duncan, supra note 11, at 551 n.243 (noting that it would be a difficult task to
show specifically that “legislators passing [a State Blaine] subjectively intended to persecute
Catholics”); see also Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 85, at 969 (admitting that evidence of anti-
Catholic hostility may “not be easy to find,” and even if it is found, courts may not be
receptive to the evidence).
96 See Green, supra note 69, at 332.  Steven Green argues that he cannot find any evi-
dence of specifically anti-Catholic animus during the debates of different state conventions
for states that were required to include the no-funding provision pursuant to the Enabling
Act, such as Washington in 1889. Id.; see also Douglas Laycock, Churches, Playgrounds, Gov-
ernment Dollars—and Schools?, 131 HARV. L. REV. 133, 166 (2017).
97 Pollvogt, supra note 75, at 926.
98 See Green, supra note 69, at 332.
99 See, e.g., Duncan, supra note 11, at 551 n.243 (“But if we had no knowledge about
why the State Blaines came into being, they would still operate unconstitutionally against
religion.”).
100 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech . . . .”).
101 See Duncan, supra note 11, at 532.
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crimination102 that forms the basis for the strongest challenge against the
State Blaines.
School choice advocates use the general nondiscrimination argument to
assert that when a state provides monetary assistance in the form of vouchers
to students attending nonreligious private schools, but denies the same assis-
tance to a student attending a religious school, the state is discriminating on
the basis of religion.103  Because the State Blaines justify this kind of discrimi-
nation, the argument follows that they violate federal rights and are
unconstitutional.
This Section will describe the nondiscrimination principle in terms of
three clauses of the First Amendment, while Part III will describe how Trinity
Lutheran helps to support and expand upon this important nondiscrimina-
tion principle.
1. Using the Free Speech Clause and “Viewpoint Discrimination”
While Chief Justice Roberts in his Trinity Lutheran opinion,104 as well as
scholars writing on the subject of First Amendment challenges to State
Blaines,105 focused on the Religion Clauses in their arguments, some argue
that the Free Speech Clause has something important to add to the nondis-
crimination dialogue.106  The discussion largely centers on the idea of “view-
point discrimination,” which prohibits government restriction of the
substantive content of the speech of “religious groups and believers.”107
Using this principle of the Free Speech Clause, the Supreme Court in
Rosenberger v. Rector of University of Virginia108 established that states cannot
discriminate based on religious viewpoint.109  The case involved the Univer-
sity of Virginia’s use of outside contractors for the printing costs of student
publications, and the University’s refusal to fund a certain student publica-
tion that promoted or manifested religious beliefs.110  In a majority opinion
written by Justice Kennedy, the Court strongly asserted the protection of
viewpoints in free speech, starting the analysis with the idea that “[i]t is axio-
matic that the government may not regulate speech based on its substantive
content or the message it conveys.”111  The Court ultimately held that the
102 Id. at 533.  According to Duncan, the nondiscrimination principle means that
“neither state nor federal governments may, consistently with the First Amendment,
restrict access to generally available public benefits based on persons’ or organizations’
religious status, purpose, affiliation, or identity.” Id.
103 See Dick Komer et al., Answers to Frequently Asked Questions About Blaine Amendments,
INST. FOR JUSTICE, http://ij.org/issues/school-choice/blaine-amendments/answers-fre-
quently-asked-questions-blaine-amendments/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2018).
104 Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017).
105 See, e.g., DeForrest, supra note 18; Duncan, supra note 11.
106 See, e.g., DeForrest, supra note 18, at 617–20; Wilhelmsen, supra note 33, at 274, 276.
107 DeForrest, supra note 18, at 618.
108 Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
109 See Wilhelmsen, supra note 33, at 276 (citing Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 832).
110 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 822–23.
111 Id. at 828 (citing Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972)).
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university could not discriminate against funding certain publications simply
because the articles were written from a certain viewpoint.112  This case sets
the precedent for future issues of viewpoint discrimination in the context of
government funding—that government can place limits on speakers in a lim-
ited public forum of its own creation—but these exclusions must be “reason-
able in light of the purpose served by the forum and [must be] viewpoint
neutral.”113
The idea of free speech and the prohibition of viewpoint discrimination
must be balanced against Establishment Clause violations when the violation
could be wound up with a sufficient state interest as to justify “content-based
restrictions” against religious speech.114  DeForrest notes that an Establish-
ment Clause argument could be made against an “attempt to use viewpoint
discrimination doctrine to overturn” State Blaines115 because it is possible
that the funding of a religious entity, directly or indirectly, conflicts with the
idea that the state cannot affirmatively support one religion over another.116
This Note will continue a discussion of Establishment Clause jurisprudence
and how it relates to nondiscrimination arguments and State Blaines in the
next Section.
The idea of viewpoint discrimination under the Free Speech Clause—
that religious speech cannot be quieted simply because of its religious charac-
ter—ultimately reinforces the nonpersecution principle in current First
Amendment jurisprudence.  According to Kyle Duncan, “the Court’s consis-
tent protection of religious speech” reinforces nondiscrimination in three
ways: First, religious persons, groups, or speech cannot be singled out and
excluded from participation in a program or forum in which it would have
been permitted but for its religious character.117  Next, the Court’s jurispru-
dence reinforces that classifications that single out religion are “constitution-
ally suspect and per se disfavored.”118  Finally, the Court’s jurisprudence
establishes that the Establishment Clause, as will be discussed below, does not
justify religious discrimination.119
In light of the prohibition on viewpoint discrimination through the Free
Speech Clause, some would argue that a state’s action of funding certain pri-
vate entities, but failing to allow the same entities that are religious in nature
access to the same funding, as the State Blaines do, would violate the nondis-
112 Id. at 837.
113 Duncan, supra note 11, at 562 (alteration in original) (quoting Lamb’s Chapel v.
Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 392–93 (1993)).
114 DeForrest, supra note 18, at 622.
115 Id.
116 DeForrest ultimately argues that this Establishment Clause argument against using
viewpoint discrimination to invalidate State Blaines is weak because of the Supreme
Court’s holding in Mitchell v. Helms, which upheld a government program providing direct
aid to a religious school, rejecting an Establishment Clause argument against the aid. Id.
at 622–23 (citing Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000)).
117 Duncan, supra note 11, at 565.
118 Id.
119 Id.
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crimination principle at the heart of the viewpoint discrimination idea.120
This Note will next examine the two other key components of the nondis-
crimination principle—the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses.
2. Nondiscrimination and the Religion Clauses
A critical look at State Blaines calls for an analysis of the Religion Clauses
of the First Amendment because of the way in which many of the State
Blaines “specifically target religious institutions for disparate treatment from
other private organizations and individuals.”121  In general terms, the Relig-
ion Clauses of the First Amendment work together to both restrain govern-
ment involvement in or endorsement of religious organizations, as well as to
protect the freedom of religious organizations to openly practice their relig-
ion and not to be discriminated against in that practice.  Specifically, the
Establishment Clause “prohibits laws that substantively institute, authorize, or
otherwise establish religion,”122 while the Free Exercise Clause “unambigu-
ously forbids laws that directly target religious conduct for penalties or disa-
bilities.”123  In this way, while the Establishment Clause works as a restraint to
disallow the government from giving religious entities special treatment, the
Free Exercise Clause works to allow religious entities fair treatment, and to
guard against mistreatment or neglect because of one’s religious belief.
While this Note will not delve extensively into the detailed and complex his-
tory of Supreme Court jurisprudence of the Religion Clauses, it will explain
the recent jurisprudence that shows how the Religion Clauses work in rela-
tion to government funding of religious organizations, as well as how they
could be used to challenge State Blaines.
Opponents of school choice use the Establishment Clause to argue that
State Blaines protect antiestablishment interests, maintaining that a strict sep-
aration of church and state is necessary to avoid any kind of partiality the
government may show towards religion.124  However, recent caselaw has con-
firmed that certain funding of religious organizations does not violate the
principles of the Establishment Clause.  The Zelman Court affirmed this
explicitly in the context of indirect aid, stating that when a government aid
program is “neutral with respect to religion, and provides assistance directly
to a broad class of citizens who, in turn, direct government aid to religious
schools wholly as a result of their own . . . private choice, the program is not
120 See DeForrest, supra note 18, at 621.
121 Id. at 607.
122 Calabresi & Salander, supra note 57, at 1026.
123 Duncan, supra note 11, at 534.
124 See, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act Is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 452–53 (1994); see also Calabresi &
Salander, supra note 57, at 1028–29 (citing Eisgruber & Sager’s argument that the Estab-
lishment Clause requires a “hermetically strict separation of church and state”).
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readily subject to challenge under the Establishment Clause.”125  Similarly,
Justice Thomas, in his concurring opinion in Rosenberger, stated that “[t]he
Clause does not compel the exclusion of religious groups from government
benefits programs that are generally available to a broad class of partici-
pants.”126  Additional funding cases, including Agostini v. Felton, have
rejected the principle that any kind of government aid that directly funds the
educational function of religious schools is per se unconstitutional.127
Because the Supreme Court has held that a variety of government funding of
religious organizations does not violate the Establishment Clause, as Steven
Calabresi and Abe Salander argue, it seems “quite difficult to claim that the
Blaine Amendments serve an ‘antiestablishment’ purpose.”128
Therefore, the caselaw suggests that the Establishment Clause itself can-
not justify prohibiting all types of state funding of religious organizations,
and particularly not in cases where the funding program is neutral and dis-
criminatorily excludes religious organizations.129  Simply put, the Establish-
125 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002) (first citing Mueller v. Allen,
463 U.S. 388 (1983); then citing Witters v. Wash. Dep’t of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481
(1986); and then citing Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993)).
126 Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 861 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
127 Jason T. Vail, Comment, School Vouchers and the Establishment Clause: Is the First Amend-
ment a Barrier to Improving Education for Low-Income Children?, 35 GONZ. L. REV. 187, 226
(1999) (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 225 (1997)).  In Agostini, the Court reex-
amined its Establishment Clause analysis, which previously used the “Lemon test.”  521 U.S.
at 219.  Under Agostini, a statute would have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting
religion, and thus would violate the Establishment Clause, if the aid results in governmen-
tal indoctrination, if it defines its recipients by reference to religion, or if it creates exces-
sive entanglement with religion. Id. at 234.
128 Calabresi & Salander, supra note 57, at 1043 (arguing that the Supreme Court hold-
ings on government funding of religious organizations comport with the original meaning
of the Establishment Clause which “only banned actual establishments of religion”).
129 Viteritti, supra note 9, at 713.
[T]he body of case law handed down by the Supreme Court suggests that the
Establishment Clause was not designed to place religious organizations at a disad-
vantage when it comes to the allocation of public benefits, and that treating relig-
ious organizations in a different (discriminatory) fashion from other institutions
raises serious questions regarding the rights protected by the Free Exercise
Clause.  This principle of neutrality was affirmed in Agostini v. Felton.
Id.  Steven Calabresi and Abe Salander cite a number of cases that support this “body of
case law”: Zelman, 536 U.S. at 662–63; Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 801 (2000) (plural-
ity opinion); Rosenberger, 514 U.S. at 845–46; Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 13–14; Witters, 474 U.S. at
489.  Calabresi & Salander, supra note 57, at 1043 n.770; see also Duncan, supra note 11, at
530 (arguing that it is “increasingly evident” that the government can provide secular bene-
fits to a variety of recipients, which includes religious recipients, on a neutral basis without
overstepping the “bounds” of the Establishment Clause).
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ment Clause itself is not a strong enough provision to justify active
discrimination by states on the basis of religion.130
While this Note argues that the Establishment Clause does not prohibit
state funding of religious organizations, opponents of State Blaines take the
argument further in maintaining that the Free Exercise Clause would compel
the state to fund religious organizations in a nondiscriminatory way, thus
invalidating the State Blaines because, by specifically targeting and discrimi-
nating against religious entities, they directly conflict with what the Free
Exercise Clause compels.131  The Supreme Court has interpreted the Free
Exercise Clause to make unconstitutional “all generic disfavoring of religious
entities . . . unless the state can demonstrate that the policy is narrowly tai-
lored to a compelling state interest.”132  In fact, prohibiting religious discrim-
ination is so important to the First Amendment that it “lies at the heart of
[what] the free exercise clause” protects.133  This is demonstrated by the
Court’s “consistent rejection” of laws that specifically impose penalties and
disabilities upon religious conduct.134
How, then, does the principle of nondiscrimination affect the discussion
about State Blaines?  The general purpose of State Blaines, despite their wide
variety, is to separate and block government funding from religious enti-
ties.135  If one accepts the discriminatory premise of the State Blaines, it sim-
ply follows that the neutrality principle of the Establishment Clause136 and
130 Calabresi & Salander, supra note 57, at 1043 (“[W]e should not allow states to
strengthen federal Establishment Clause protections in a way that discriminates on the
basis of religion.”).
131 See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 85, at 963 (asserting that “anti-Blaine forces” prefer to
approach the problem of religious discrimination by using the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment).
132 Id. (citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520
(1993)).  The Court in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye held that “[a] law burdening relig-
ious practice that is not neutral or not of general application . . . must advance ‘interests of
the highest order’ and must be narrowly tailored in pursuit of those interests.” Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 546 (quoting McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 628
(1978)).  Under Lukumi, a law is not neutral when its object is to “infringe upon or restrict
practices because of their religious motivation.”  Duncan, supra note 11, at 544 (quoting
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 533).
133 Duncan, supra note 11, at 533.  Duncan contrasts the nondiscrimination principle
with the “non-exemption” principle, best exemplified in the Smith decision, which states
that the Free Exercise Clause “does not require courts to grant religion-based exemptions
from the burdens of genuinely neutral laws.” Id. (discussing Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872 (1990)).  He emphasizes that the nonexemption rule limits the nonpersecution rule,
yet “it is clear that the Free Exercise Clause unambiguously forbids laws that directly target
religious conduct for penalties or disabilities.” Id. at 534.
134 Id. at 546.
135 Id. at 516, 566 (“[W]hat unites all State Blaines is the explicit object of separating
public benefits from religious persons, institutions, and purposes.”).
136 See Frederick Mark Gedicks, Reconstructing the Blaine Amendments, 2 FIRST AMEND. L.
REV. 85, 96–97 (2004) (arguing that religious neutrality is the predominant doctrinal rule
used to measure the constitutionality of governmental distributions of funds); see also
DeForrest, supra note 18, at 609 (“If the government opens up it [sic] coffers to provide aid
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the nondiscrimination principle of the Free Exercise Clause137 render the
amendments, which clearly “place religion at a civil disadvantage with respect
to all conduct, institutions, and persons that are ‘non-religious,’”138 as viola-
tive of the First Amendment.  In the context of school choice programs, this
would imply that if a state funds neutral school choice programs, but bars
religious schools from participating under the state’s State Blaine provision,
it would violate this principle of nondiscrimination.139  Although some laws
can constitutionally burden religious practice if both neutral and generally
applicable, the State Blaines “exclude themselves” from this category because
of their direct targeting of religious institutions that would otherwise be eligi-
ble for the benefits.140
The recent Trinity Lutheran opinion, which this Note will analyze next,
builds upon this Free Exercise and nondiscrimination jurisprudence, fore-
casting where the modern Court could lead school choice advocates in chal-
lenging State Blaines.
III. TRINITY LUTHERAN AND FREE EXERCISE
A. Background
The story of Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer began in
Columbia, Missouri, in 2012, when Trinity Lutheran Church Child Learning
Center (“Trinity Lutheran”), a preschool and daycare owned and operated
by Trinity Lutheran Church, applied for a state grant in order to obtain fund-
ing for a new rubber surface for its playground.141  The grant is part of Mis-
souri’s Scrap Tire Program, which is administered by Missouri’s Department
of Natural Resources (“the Department”).142  The grant is given annually to
“qualifying nonprofit organizations that purchase playground surfaces made
from recycled tires.”143  The Department granted fourteen grants in the 2012
Scrap Tire Program.144  Although Trinity Lutheran originally ranked fifth
among the forty-four applicants in the program,145 the Department rejected
Trinity Lutheran’s application because it was ineligible to receive a grant
to secular private schools or their students, the principle of religious neutrality requires
that they should also allow religionists and religious schools to participate in such aid
programs.”).
137 DeForrest, supra note 18, at 626 (“While no state is required to provide grants or aid
for students attending private schools, if a state does decide to provide such aid, it simply
cannot discriminate against religious believers and institutions and still comply with the
requirements of the First Amendment.”).
138 Duncan, supra note 11, at 550.
139 See DeForrest, supra note 18, at 609.
140 Duncan, supra note 11, at 550.
141 Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2017 (2017).
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 2018.
145 Id.  The Department awards grants to applicants who score highest on several objec-
tive criteria, including the poverty level in the applicant’s area and the applicant’s recycling
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under Article I, § 7 of the Missouri Constitution.146  The provision, which
incorporates classic Blaine Amendment language limiting government funds
for religious organizations, reads:
That no money shall ever be taken from the public treasury, directly or indi-
rectly, in aid of any church, sect or denomination of religion, or in aid of any
priest, preacher, minister or teacher thereof, as such; and that no preference
shall be given to nor any discrimination made against any church, sect or
creed of religion, or any form of religious faith or worship.147
Pursuant to this constitutional provision, the Department denied Trinity
Lutheran’s application solely because of its status as a religious organiza-
tion.148  Trinity Lutheran brought suit against the Department, alleging that
the denial based on the provision of the Missouri Constitution constituted a
violation of the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause.  The district court
granted the Department’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that, under
Locke v. Davey, the Free Exercise Clause “generally does not prohibit with-
holding an affirmative benefit on account of religion.”149  Accordingly, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s ruling, and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari.150
B. The Opinion
Chief Justice John Roberts wrote the majority opinion for the Court, and
reversed the lower court by holding that the Department violated the Free
Exercise Clause by denying Trinity Lutheran’s application.151  After explain-
ing that the parties agreed that the Establishment Clause did not prevent
Missouri from awarding this grant to a religious organization,152 the Court
plan. Id. at 2017.  Trinity Lutheran scored high enough to be awarded a grant, but for its
religious status. Id. at 2018.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 2017 (quoting MO. CONST. art. I, § 7).
148 “[T]he Department had a strict and express policy of denying grants to any appli-
cant owned or controlled by a church, sect, or other religious entity,” which was “com-
pelled by Article I, Section 7 of the Missouri Constitution.” Id.  Although the Governor
later rejected this policy, the announcement did not moot Trinity Lutheran’s case. See id.
at 2019 n.1.
149 Id. at 2018.
150 For a short description of the political environment in which certiorari was granted
and the case was heard at the Supreme Court, including the death of Justice Scalia, elec-
tion of Donald Trump, and confirmation of Justice Gorsuch, see Garnett & Blais, supra
note 71, at 111–12.
151 Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2019.
152 Richard Garnett and Jackson Blais note that the parties’ agreement on the Estab-
lishment Clause issue is important, as it “suggests that the evolution . . . in the Court’s
approach to cases involving public support for, and cooperation with, religious institutions
is fairly settled.”  Garnett & Blais, supra note 71, at 113.  However, Justice Sotomayor radi-
cally disagreed on this issue in her dissent, as she argued that the Establishment Clause
would expressly prohibit this type of funding. See Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2028
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The Establishment Clause does not allow Missouri to grant
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explained that the Free Exercise Clause “‘protect[s] religious observers
against unequal treatment’ and subjects to the strictest scrutiny laws that tar-
get the religious for ‘special disabilities’ based on their ‘religious status.’”153
The Court discussed a line of cases154 that explains the Court’s precedent of
“repeatedly” confirming “that denying a generally available benefit solely on
account of religious identity imposes a penalty on the free exercise of relig-
ion that can be justified only by a state interest ‘of the highest order.’”155
The Court went on to explain that the Department’s policy, enacted pur-
suant to Missouri’s constitutional provision, “expressly discriminates” against
applicants who would be otherwise eligible, solely because of their religious
status.156  Because of its religious status, Trinity Lutheran was actively dis-
criminated against, encroaching upon its free exercise of religion.  In apply-
ing for the grant, the church was simply “assert[ing] a right to participate in a
government benefit program without having to disavow its religious charac-
ter.”157  In affirming Trinity Lutheran’s right to participate in a secular, neu-
tral program, the Court affirmed important principles of nondiscrimination,
extending the principle not only to cases where religious organizations are
prohibited from engaging in religious conduct, but also to cases where they
are “indirect[ly] coerc[ed]” or penalized because of their exercise of
religion.158
The Court clearly distinguished this case from Locke v. Davey,159 explain-
ing that Davey involved a denial of a government benefit because of what the
plaintiff would do with the funds—“prepare for the ministry.”160 Trinity
Lutheran, however, involved a denial of government funds because of what it
is—a religious organization.161  The Court also noted that the training of
clergy clearly implicates a state’s antiestablishment interests, as a state should
not be made to pay for the training of clergy, while the same cannot be said
of a program to resurface playgrounds.162  While in Davey, students could
continue to retain their religious beliefs and receive the scholarship by using
the Church’s funding request because the Church uses the Learning Center, including its
playground, in conjunction with its religious mission.”).
153 Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2019 (alteration in original) (quoting Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533, 542 (1993)).
154 See id. at 2019–21 (first discussing Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); then
discussing McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (plurality opinion); then discussing Lyng
v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988); then discussing Emp’t Div. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); and then discussing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S.
520).
155 Id. at 2019 (quoting McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 628).
156 Id. at 2021–22 (“[T]he Department’s policy puts Trinity Lutheran to a choice: It
may participate in an otherwise available benefit program or remain a religious
institution.”).
157 Id. at 2022.
158 Id. (quoting Lyng, 483 U.S. at 450).
159 540 U.S. 712 (2004).  For a discussion of Davey, see supra Part II.
160 Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2023.
161 Id.
162 See id.
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their scholarships to take religious courses at religious schools, Trinity
Lutheran could not continue to espouse its religious beliefs and practices
and receive this government funding.163
Finally, the Court ruled that the Department did not express a strong
enough state interest to justify this kind of penalty on religious practice.164
The Department only asserted as a justification its policy preference to
“skat[e] as far as possible from religious establishment concerns.”165  The
Court simply stated that this specified interest “cannot qualify as compelling,”
because it is “already ensured under the Establishment Clause.”166  Because
the Establishment Clause protections are limited by the Free Exercise Clause,
Missouri could not avoid an entanglement of church and state “to the point
of expressly denying a qualified religious entity a public benefit solely
because of its religious character.”167
The majority opinion was joined by seven of the Justices, with Justices
Thomas, Gorsuch, and Breyer separately concurring, and Justices Sotomayor
and Ginsburg dissenting.  Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined the majority,
but specifically did not join footnote three of the opinion.168  Footnote three
limits the Court’s holding to cases involving “express discrimination based on
religious identity with respect to playground resurfacing.”169  Justice Gorsuch
explained in his concurrence that he doubts the “stability” of this distinction
between religious use and status, and worries that the footnote will unneces-
sarily constrain the Court’s holding to an arbitrary set of cases, like those
involving “playground resurfacing” or those “with some association with chil-
dren’s safety or health.”170  Justice Gorsuch spoke about the “general princi-
ples” of nondiscrimination, which suggests that he favors a broader
protection for the free exercise of religion, including both the status of a
religious entity and its practice of religion.171  Justice Breyer concurred only
in the Court’s judgment, emphasizing the nature of the “public benefit” in
Trinity Lutheran’s case.172  Because the program at issue was a “general pro-
gram designed to secure or to improve the health and safety of children,” it
fit into the category of general governmental services, and according to the
163 Id. But see Laycock, supra note 96, at 159–60 (refuting this reasoning by the Court,
explaining that it is not an accurate description of the facts in Davey and emphasizing the
more basic distinction between Davey and Trinity Lutheran: that “only Davey involved a
religious use of the state’s money”).  It is worth noting that Justice Thomas, in his concur-
rence, disagreed with the Court’s original reasoning and holding in Davey, and did not join
the Court’s “endorsement” of Davey in this opinion. Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2025
(Thomas, J., concurring in part).
164 Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2024.
165 Id.
166 Id. (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981)).
167 Id.
168 Id. at 2025 (Thomas, J., concurring in part).
169 Id. at 2024 n.3 (plurality opinion).
170 Id. at 2025–26 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part).
171 Id. at 2026.
172 Id. (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
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Court in Everson, it “is obviously not the purpose of the First Amendment” to
cut off funding for these services.173  While Justice Breyer agreed that play-
ground resurfacing fit into this category, he refused to apply the holding to
any other kinds of public benefits, which “come in many shapes and sizes.”174
Lastly, Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented from the
Court’s holding.  Justice Sotomayor’s double dissent175 rejected both the
claim that the Establishment Clause would not prevent funding from going
to Trinity Lutheran, and the holding that the Free Exercise Clause compels
that funding go to Trinity Lutheran.176  She argued that the funding at issue
would “further religious activity,” however remotely, which is prohibited by
the Establishment Clause.177  Furthermore, she claimed that a state is not
required to fund religious entities, and can “single[ ] out religious entities
for exclusion from its reach,” depending on the reasons it does so.178  As
Douglas Laycock discusses, Justice Sotomayor appealed to the history of the
United States.179  She discussed a “state-by-state review” of the church fund-
ing debate, and ultimately argued that the unconstitutionality of “religious
assessments,” meaning “special funding for the religious functions of
churches,” is central to this country’s founding.180  Justice Sotomayor relied
heavily on Davey in upholding a “separationist commitment,”181 and warned
that the majority opinion will lead us to “a place where separation of church
and state is a constitutional slogan, not a constitutional commitment.”182
C. Trinity Lutheran and the State Blaines
Although Trinity Lutheran was highly publicized as a case about the State
Blaines, the Court makes no mention of the Blaine Amendment contro-
versy.183  The Missouri constitutional provision at issue in the case is not
173 Id. at 2027 (quoting Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1947)).
174 Id.
175 Garnett & Blais, supra note 71, at 118 (“In a sense, Justice Sotomayor dissented
twice.”).
176 Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2027–41 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
177 Id. at 2030.
178 Id. at 2032; see also Garnett & Blais, supra note 71, at 120.
179 See Laycock, supra note 96, at 142–43; see, e.g., Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2032–35
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
180 Laycock, supra note 96, at 143.  Laycock argues that the dissent was incorrect
because “no one is proposing that kind of funding today.” Id.  Instead, the issue revolves
around “religiously neutral funding” of “broader categor[ies] of private activity,” and so
the funded activity is mostly secular. Id.
181 Garnett & Blais, supra note 71, at 120.
182 Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2041 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
183 Garnett & Blais, supra note 71, at 125 (“The commentary leading up to Trinity
Lutheran regularly emphasized the Blaine Amendments’ history, context, and purposes and
treated the case as, at least in part, a case ‘about’ them.”); see also Philip Hamburger,
Prejudice and the Blaine Amendments, FIRST THINGS (June 20, 2017), https://www.firstthings
.com/web-exclusives/2017/06/prejudice-and-the-blaine-amendments (discussing State
Blaine Amendments in conjunction with Trinity Lutheran).
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clearly a State Blaine, although it uses the same language that prohibits fund-
ing for religious organizations, which is the purpose of the Blaines.184  How-
ever, Justice Sotomayor put Missouri’s Article I, § 7 in the same category of
these state “no aid” provisions, citing thirty-eight states that have adopted
State Blaines.185  Apart from her mention that State Blaines exist, and that
states have promoted a stricter separation of church and state through these
provisions,186 State Blaines are absent from all of the opinions.187
It is unclear why the Court refused to mention the States Blaines at all,
but the Court’s holding was a ruling on a state’s impermissible interpretation
of a no funding provision—here, Article 1, § 7 of the Missouri Constitution.
The opinion, therefore, could have serious consequences for future chal-
lenges against policies based on State Blaines.  A decision that refuses to tol-
erate the use of a State Blaine to exclude a religious entity from a neutral
funding program signifies a confirmation of nondiscrimination principles
and a Court that could go to greater lengths to protect religious practice
from the strict separation policies furthered by State Blaines.188
IV. THE FUTURE OF STATE BLAINE AMENDMENTS
Since the Court’s ruling in Trinity Lutheran, commentators have spoken
about it in relationship to State Blaines, as well as its potential effects on the
State Blaines’ constitutionality.189  The Court’s holding that a policy based
184 Missouri has a specific State Blaine in its education article, added in 1870, but “Mis-
souri did not rely on this provision in Trinity Lutheran, presumably because it is too obvi-
ously a Blaine amendment.”  Laycock, supra note 96, at 167.  However, Laycock argues that
the “timing and language” of Missouri’s Article I, § 7 “suggests that it was part and parcel of
the movement for Blaine provisions . . . .” Id. at 168.
185 Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2037, 2037 n.10 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
186 Id. at 2037–38.
187 Several organizations submitting amicus briefs made the argument that Missouri’s
constitutional provision is unconstitutional because of its antireligious motives, yet the
Court still refused to acknowledge the issue in its opinion. See Garnett & Blais, supra note
71, at 126 n.100.  Garnett and Blais posit that this refusal could signify the Court avoiding
the line of argument that the amendments are unconstitutional because of their antire-
ligious motivations. Id. at 126 (“[The rejection of animus arguments] could indicate reser-
vations by some justices regarding judicial doctrines and tests that require close scrutiny
and criticism of official actors’ motives and aims.”).
188 See Kimberly Winston, What is the Blaine Amendment and Did SCOTUS Kill It?, RELIG-
ION NEWS SERVS. (June 28, 2017), http://religionnews.com/2017/06/28/the-splainer-
what-is-the-blaine-amendment-and-did-scotus-kill-it/.
189 See, e.g., id.; John L. Allen, Jr. & Ines San Martin, Lori: After ‘Trinity Lutheran,’ All
Anti-Catholic ‘Blaine Amendments’ Should Fall, CRUX (July 6, 2017), https://cruxnow.com/
interviews/2017/07/06/lori-trinity-lutheran-anti-catholic-blaine-amendments-fall/; Sarah
Pulliam Bailey, The Supreme Court Sided with Trinity Lutheran Church. Here’s Why That Matters.,
WASH. POST (June 26, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/
2017/06/26/the-supreme-court-sided-with-trinity-lutheran-church-heres-why-that-matters/
?utm_term=.d9d90c86c3bb; Eric Fehrnstrom, Ruling Against Blaine Amendments Is a Victory
for Liberty, BOS. GLOBE (July 6, 2017), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2017/07/
06/ruling-against-blaine-amendments-victory-for-liberty/z78hXrdNzyis3GkasfV72J/story
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on a State Blaine’s antifunding principles violates the Free Exercise Clause
directly challenges the “discriminatory operation”190 of the State Blaines.
The question now is: Will the Court continue to strike down no-funding poli-
cies based on State Blaines, seriously affecting debates on school choice and
other state-funded programs?  In part, this question depends on how broadly
the Court is willing to interpret its holding in Trinity Lutheran.
As discussed in Section III.B, the Court included a footnote that explic-
itly limits the Court’s holding to “express discrimination based on religious
identity with respect to playground resurfacing.”191  The footnote, while not
joined by a majority of the Court,192 signals the Court’s potential hesitation
to speak too broadly or definitively on the subject of religious funding.  The
footnote implies that the Court’s reasoning only applies to secular uses of
funding, like playground resurfacing.  Additionally, Justice Sotomayor’s
“bracing” and “unyielding”193 dissent demonstrates that at least two members
of the Court favor a strong resistance to broadening Free Exercise principles
and strengthening Establishment Clause protections for church and state
separation.  Justice Sotomayor’s long citation of State Blaines to support her
argument might show an acceptance of these types of constitutional “no aid”
provisions.
In spite of these signs of resistance and hesitation to making broad dec-
larations about government funding to religious entities in other contexts,
Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence does show a more open attitude toward broad-
ening protections for religious entities.  He rejected a strict line between
funding based on religious status or use implicated in footnote three, saying
that “[i]t is free exercise either way.”194  If the “use” of the government fund-
ing at issue does not need to be secular, this could greatly broaden Free
Exercise protections.  Justice Gorsuch emphasized the “general principles”
set out in the case, which “do not permit discrimination against religious
exercise—whether on the playground or anywhere else.”195  His acceptance
of “generally applicable, nondiscrimination principles”196 indicates that the
Court has the potential to continue to affirm these principles in more signifi-
cant ways.  If Justice Gorsuch is willing to strike down religious discrimination
of any form, “whether on the playground or anywhere else,” it is possible that
.html; Hamburger, supra note 183; Christian Sagers, How the Supreme Court’s Trinity
Lutheran Decision Could Affect Anti-Religious Laws, FEDERALIST (June 26, 2017), http://
thefederalist.com/2017/06/26/supreme-courts-trinity-lutheran-decision-affect-anti-relig-
ious-laws/; Valerie Strauss, Will the Supreme Court’s Trinity Decision Lead to the Spread of School
Voucher Programs?, WASH. POST (June 26, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
answer-sheet/wp/2017/06/26/will-the-supreme-courts-trinity-decision-lead-to-the-spread-
of-school-voucher-programs/.
190 Duncan, supra note 11, at 499.
191 Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2024 n.3. (plurality opinion).
192 See Garnett & Blais, supra note 71, at 124.
193 Id. at 118.
194 Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2026 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part).
195 Id.
196 Garnett & Blais, supra note 71, at 124.
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he would be willing to strike down State Blaines that expressly take away relig-
ious entities’ right to participate in neutral government funding programs,
potentially regardless of whether the funding would be used in strictly secular
ways.  This general principle of nondiscrimination permeates the Court’s
opinion, strengthening a potential Free Exercise challenge against the State
Blaines.197  The Court has already remanded several cases that could shed
light on the Blaines’ future sooner rather than later.198
A final consequence of the Trinity Lutheran opinion is that it could shift
the focus of State Blaine challenges away from the “animus” or “motive” argu-
ments199 and toward challenges that are more focused on express discrimina-
tion, as developed in Trinity Lutheran.  As Douglas Laycock explains, “[i]f a
state’s Blaine provision results in facial discrimination” against religious enti-
ties, “then motive should not matter after Trinity Lutheran.”200  The Court in
Trinity Lutheran indicated that “express discrimination” should be enough to
sustain a challenge, regardless of the motive behind the law.201  Because of
the inherent difficulties in sustaining a challenge based on motive, the Trinity
Lutheran opinion pushes future challenges to rely on these broad principles
of nondiscrimination under the Free Exercise Clause.
CONCLUSION
The Court’s holding in Trinity Lutheran directly targets laws which
require individuals to “choose between their religious beliefs and receiving a
government benefit.”202  State Blaines are often used in this way to fulfill
their original purpose—to broadly block government funding from reaching
any type of religious organization—and so lead us to question their constitu-
tionality under First Amendment principles of nondiscrimination.  Because
Trinity Lutheran’s holding applies to laws regarding “express discrimination
and secular uses of funding,” it clearly implicates State Blaines that expressly
197 This potential challenge to the State Blaines—prohibiting any religious discrimina-
tion in neutral government funding programs—has particular significance for the school
choice proponents. See Laycock, supra note 96, at 169 (“The logic of nondiscrimination
should extend these principles to funding secular functions that are to some extent com-
bined with religious functions, as in church-affiliated schools.”).
198 After ruling on Trinity Lutheran, the Court remanded two separate challenges to
state no-aid provisions in the context of school choice, which will be important in terms of
how the lower courts interpret the Court’s reasoning, and for the general future of State
Blaine challenges after Trinity Lutheran. See Garnett & Blais, supra note 71, at 124–25;
Laycock, supra note 96, at 160–61.
199 See supra Section II.B.
200 Laycock, supra note 96, at 166–67; see also Fehrnstrom, supra note 189 (“The fact
that the Blaine amendments are firmly implanted in anti-Catholic prejudice is no longer
the main issue with their continued existence.  The far more serious problem is that they
are unconstitutional because . . . they force churches to choose between their religious
character or participation in a public program.”).
201 Laycock, supra note 96, at 167.
202 Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2023 (2017)
(quoting Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 720–21 (2004)).
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exclude religious organizations from funding that is available to any other
organization based on neutral criteria.203
This Note argues that if a State Blaine goes beyond the bounds of what
the Constitution permits and compels in terms of the free exercise of relig-
ion, it has the potential to be struck down as unconstitutional.  Furthermore,
this Note argues that opponents of State Blaines have an even stronger Free
Exercise argument against the provisions after the holding in Trinity
Lutheran.  Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion signals an affirmation of
nondiscrimination principles, while Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence signals a
willingness to take the more general principles of nondiscrimination and to
apply them in future Free Exercise cases, no matter what the subject matter
of the case.  While Justice Sotomayor strongly disagreed and advocated a
much stricter Establishment Clause jurisprudence, as well as a much less per-
missive Free Exercise jurisprudence, her dissent affirms the idea that the
Court’s reasoning has the potential to “profoundly change[ ]” the relation-
ship between church and state in this country.204
The Free Speech Clause, the Establishment Clause, and the Free Exer-
cise Clause of the First Amendment, as examined in this Note, together rein-
force nondiscrimination principles that work against the states’
interpretations of State Blaines that discriminatorily burden the free exercise
of religion.  The First Amendment decisions leading up to, and including,
Trinity Lutheran have led the Court to a point where State Blaines could be
successfully challenged in federal court, knocking down a roadblock for relig-
ious freedom and school choice advocates.  For opponents of State Blaines,
Trinity Lutheran means a step away from animus arguments, and a push
towards arguments based on discrimination found on the face of the law or
policy itself.
Federal courts may soon decide the fate of several State Blaines as
applied to school choice.205  Following the argument put forth in this Note,
future courts hearing challenges to State Blaines should be receptive to
broader protections for religious freedom made available under Trinity
Lutheran—protections that will allow a religious entity to freely practice its
religion while being accepted as a full, participating member in the
community.
203 Laycock, supra note 96, at 169.
204 Trintiy Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2027 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
205 See Taxpayers for Pub. Educ. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 351 P.3d 461 (Colo. 2015);
Moses v. Skandera, 367 P.3d 838 (N.M. 2015).
